Anza shareholders liquidating trust
The court began from the proposition that to assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud, a plaintiff must have relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations.
Ideal not having alleged that it relied on petitioners’ false tax returns, the court concluded Ideal could not go forward with its RICO claims. Addressing Ideal’s § 1962(c) claim, the court held that where a complaint alleges a pattern of racketeering activity “that was intended to and did give the defendant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff, the complaint adequately pleads proximate cause, and the plaintiff has standing to pursue a civil RICO claim.” Id., at 263.
The opening of this new facility caused Ideal to lose “significant business and market share.” App. Petitioners moved to dismiss Ideal’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b).
The District Court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
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Ideal’s amended complaint contains, as relevant here, two RICO claims. It alleges a violation of § 1962(a), which makes it unlawful for any person who has received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity “to use or invest” that income “in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,” an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
The claims assert that petitioners, by submitting the fraudulent tax returns, committed various acts of mail fraud (when they sent the returns by mail) and wire fraud (when they sent them electronically). As described in the complaint, petitioners used funds generated by their fraudulent tax scheme to open National’s Bronx location.
258, 268 (1992), this Court held that a plaintiff may sue under § 1964(c) only if the alleged RICO violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
That case arose from a complaint filed by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private corporation with a duty to reimburse the customers of registered broker-dealers who became unable to meet their financial obligations. Ideal’s theory is that Joseph and Vincent Anza harmed it by defrauding the New York tax authority and using the 458*458 proceeds from the fraud to offer lower prices designed to attract more customers.
SIPC claimed that the petitioner, Robert Holmes, conspired with others to manipulate stock prices. 519 (1983), the Court held that “a plaintiff’s right to sue under § 4 required a showing that the defendant’s violation not only was a `but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.” Holmes, supra, at 268 (citing Associated Gen. This reasoning, the Court noted in Holmes, “applies just as readily to § 1964(c).” 503 U. The Holmes Court turned to the common-law foundations of the proximate-cause requirement, and specifically the “demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Ibid. The RICO violation alleged by Ideal is that the Anzas conducted National’s affairs through a pattern of mail fraud and wire fraud.
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